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To determine why the Army profession included civilians, it was first necessary to investigate how the concept of a profession has evolved. The concept of a profession was first applied to civilian occupations before it was imported into discussions of the military. Both history of the civilian and military uses of the term profession revealed that the Army Profession concept is ahistorical. Surveying key profession of arms models also illustrates Army leaders broke with tradition by making the Army Profession an all-inclusive model. A review of narrative and organizational theory suggests Army leaders may have developed the Army Profession concept as a rhetorical device rather than a literal description of the Army. One organizational theorist, Valerie Fournier described a theory of professionalization in which an organization's leaders could use the concept of a profession to inculcate behavioral norms within the organization.
Examining Army doctrine and Army Profession Campaign literature supports the inference that Army leaders intended the Army Profession Campaign to serve as a rhetorical construct with which they could improve discipline throughout the force. A review of the literature and doctrine support the conclusion that Army leaders were greatly concerned with improving discipline at the time they adopted the Army Profession concept. A review of the literature and doctrine prove Army leaders were aware of narrative theory. A review of the same materials proves Dr. Snider, the chief architect of the Army Profession Campaign, was aware of Fournier's argument that a professionalization rhetoric campaign could improve self-discipline within a workforce.
The research into the Army Profession concept through the lens of narrative and organizational theory does not conclusively prove Army leaders developed the Army Profession construct by applying Fournier's theory. However, the evidence collected supports the inference that Army leaders did develop the Army Profession concept as a rhetorical device. Furthermore, the evidence makes clear Army leaders chose to employ professionalization rhetoric as a possible way to correct observed behavioral deficiencies or to prevent a forecasted decline in discipline.
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INTRODUCTION
There will be times when we are going to be conducting operations that you won't understand. They are going to make you uncomfortable. People you know and love are going to be hurt because of this; and, we want the American people to say, "That's OK, we trust you." -Brigadier General Sean B. MacFarland
In April 2011, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) hosted a panel on the profession of arms and civil-military relations. During his opening remarks, General Sean
MacFarland cautioned the audience that public trust in the military could be easily lost through misdeeds and unprofessional behavior. Highlighting some egregious examples of such behavior, General MacFarland listed Vietnam body counts, the Aberdeen Proving Grounds drill sergeants sex scandals, Abu Grahib, the "Revolt of the Generals," and the controversy preceding General
McCrystal's resignation. General MacFarland said the Army must police itself:
If we don't hold ourselves accountable, then our political masters will. They will step in and then you get friction between civil-military relations [sic] . We need to show that we don't need their help; that we're doing OK. We do that through accountability, transparency, integrity and expertise.
According to General MacFarland, healthy civil-military relations rely on credibility and trust. 3 Credibility and trust derive from discipline. 4 Therefore, systemic indiscipline would threaten not just military effectiveness but also civil-military relations. General MacFarland was not alone in thinking the Army needed to fundamentally reexamine discipline and develop methods to reinforce it throughout the service. Sinclair's alleged criminal misconduct-for which he will face court martial and a possible life sentence-as "the latest in a series of missteps by military leaders," thereby insinuating such serious offenses had become commonplace. 10 By providing specific examples in which the institution's credibility came into question as the result of indiscipline, high visibility misconduct cases have reinforced General MacFarland's argument the Army must do more to police its ranks itself.
Building on the ACPME report recommendations from the EXCEL study, Army leaders converted the Army Profession of Arms Campaign from a dialogue about the profession of arms into an educational campaign designed to teach service members-both uniformed and civilianthat they are members of the Army Profession and as such must behave as professionals. The examination of the Army Profession concept through the lens of narrative and organizational theory suggests Army leaders developed the Army Profession Campaign as a rhetorical device to establish and control an internal-Army narrative with which they could reinforce individual self-discipline. Army leaders were never interested in an academic debate.
They were, from the outset, looking for a way to correct observed behavioral deficiencies or to prevent a forecasted decline in discipline. 
NON-MILITARY PROFESSIONS
To understand the questions surrounding the Army Profession concept, it is necessary to know how and why people have historically applied the concept of a profession to other occupations. Reviewing the evolving concepts of a profession serves three purposes. First, it highlights the ahistorical nature of the Army's description of an all-inclusive Army Profession.
Second, it reveals the motives people have had when they applied the concept to their own or other favored professions. Third, it suggests that the act of categorizing occupations as professions or something other than professions is not simple classification in accordance with a set of unbiased and generally accepted criteria. It is important to demonstrate this point since so many of the scholars supporting the Army Profession Campaign purport to do just that. To accomplish the above listed purposes, this section presents a brief history of the sociological study of professions. It then presents five sociological theories of professions which taken together represent the broader field of study. Contrasting the Army Profession Campaign with these theories also illustrates in what particular ways it diverges from sociological applications of the theory of professions.
Sociologists began studying professions as early as 1934 when Carr-Saunders and Wilson published, The Professions. The study of professions has undergone many changes. At first, the study was limited to classification of occupations into categories. Those categories were little more than a division of skilled labor into profession and non-profession. Sociologists who espoused these models argued professions were occupations that had certain organizational and social characteristics that differentiated them from nonprofessional occupations. The authors of these early models did not address how occupations became professions. 16 Theories of that process, or professionalization, did not emerge until the late 1940s. 17 Proponents of early professionalization theories assumed occupations became professions through a gradual progression. They assumed the occupation's practitioners did not intentionally drive the process.
Researchers later developed theories of professionalization in which occupational practitioners motivated by several factors drove the process of their own professionalization. The practitionerdriven theories differed mainly in whether the practitioners were selfish or altruistic in wanting their occupation to become a profession. During the early to mid 1960s, some sociologists began to see professionalization in terms of social mobility and egalitarianism. To them, professionalism became movement along a spectrum with professions on one end and labor on the other. This reduced any distinction between professions and non-professional occupations to a distinction of degrees instead of a true demarcation. Although the study of professions had entered a theoretical realm, it fundamentally remained categorization of occupations.
In the 1960s and '70s, the study of professions began moving away from categorizing occupations towards asking questions about society's relationship to professions. Sociologists had become less interested in categorizing occupations and more interested in how occupations they presumed to be professions benefited society. Ibid, 5. change within the occupation. In other words, an occupation became a profession when society recognized it as such.
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In the 1980s, sociologists turned their attention to the perceived competition between professionals and non-professionals and between professionals and other professionals. Since the 1980s, interest in the study of professions generally has decreased among sociologists. If at all, they examined professions as an element of the study of the organization of labor and the study of work. Recently, the study of professions has emerged inside studies of the self-ideation of workers and worker motivation. Rather than categorizing occupations, sociologists following this line of reasoning, examine professions and professionalism as a "discourse." They ask how managers use that discourse to mold subordinates' self-identity and self-discipline. In 1964, Harold Wilensky reacted to a growing body of work which suggested many if not all occupations were beginning to meet the criteria for professions by writing "The Professionalization of Everyone?" In that article, Wilensky argued there were two criteria for determining whether an occupation was truly a profession. His proposed criteria stipulated that to be a profession the work performed must require substantial training, and second that members of the profession had to perform according to a set of shared values including one to place the interests of the client above the practitioner's own interests. He called this the "service ideal."
That notion remains strongly tied to the concept of professions and appears to be included in the Army Profession model.
Wilensky also offered a historical sequence of professionalization that he developed from his understanding of the histories of occupations he accepted as true professions. According to Wilensky, several occupations were professions as early as the middle ages. Applying his criteria, including the requirement to have a service ideal, he said some groups of military commissioned officers had attained professional status as early as the sixteenth century but dentists, architects, engineers, and CPAs did not attain that status until the turn of the twentieth century. According to Wilensky's theory, not all occupations will become professions. Because his criteria were fixed, his theory suggests professionalization is something that can be measured. Because anyone can apply his criteria, Wilensky argued, a non-professional occupational group attempting to convince nonmembers that it was a profession would risk ridicule. 25 Systems theory proponents argue that one must consider myriad levels of interactions between actors involved in a group dynamic. 26 Abbott, The System of Professions, 4-15. Very shortly into the campaign, however, it became apparent that the necessity to include Army civilians in the conceptualization of the Army as a military profession precluded the "of Arms" description for all the Army. With the current force structure Soldiers simply cannot perform their lethal craft effectively without the support of a highly professional Civilian Corps.
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In other words, a traditional understanding of a profession of arms could not achieve the purpose underlying the Army Profession Campaign. Weigley's model of a profession of arms not only excluded civilians, it excluded the majority of the US Army.
Weigley was not an outlier when it came to describing a profession of arms in terms of exclusion rather than inclusion. Of course, the conceptualization of a US profession of arms has Fundamentally, Morris Janowitz agreed with Huntington's assertion that a profession of arms included only military commissioned officers. Unlike Huntington, Janowitz, a sociologist, was less interested in delineating who was and who was not a member of the profession. He was more interested in how the profession was changing. Also unlike Huntington, Janowitz did not describe the profession as apolitical. According to Janowitz, military professionals reluctantly became involved in political decision-making when realities forced them to accept a "broader definition of their role than their self-conceptions, traditions, and logic would have suggested." Janowitz described a "narrowing skill differential between military and civilian elites" which blurred the boundary of the profession's expertise. Janowitz presented a commander-centric model of the profession of arms in which the commander's role was shifting to a more technical and managerial one. According to Janowitz, military commanders retained a "heroic leader" role mainly as the foundation for the profession's self-identity and its public image. 34 This understanding of Janowitz's model of a profession of arms supports the argument that an appeal to self-identity is central to the Army Profession Campaign. Janowitz's model also supports the assertion that the Army Profession concept is ahistorically inclusive.
Charles Moskos, who studied under Janowitz, developed a conceptualization of the profession of arms radically different from that of either the Huntington or Janowitz models. According to Ochs and Capps, narrative is the way people cognitively process sensory inputs into experience. Narrative explains why experiences are subjective. Ochs and Capps reject the notion that people can directly experience and share an understanding of disembodied objectivity. Instead, people create their own independent realities. Ochs and Capps call these realities personal narratives. According to this narrative theory, an individual's subjective reality influences how the individual perceives everything including his or herself. Ochs and Capps argue that these subjective realities can directly shape individuals' "feelings, beliefs, and actions." In a broad sense, a narrative is a story constructed to give meaning to things and events. Individuals, groups, organizations, and countries all have narratives with many components that reflect and reveal how they define themselves. . . . They incorporate symbols, historical events, and artifacts tied together with a logic that explains their reason for being. In 1999, Valerie Fournier described a business practice in which the leaders of an organization use the concept of profession as a "disciplinary mechanism." According to Fournier, the leaders of an organization could achieve collective behavior modification through appeals to individuals' self-identity. Those appeals took the form of describing the collective group as a profession and describing acceptable behavior for professionals. According to Fournier's theory, once an individual self-identified as a professional, he or she felt compelled to behave within professional norms. By establishing those norms, the leaders of the organization essentially established individual behavioral limits. In this way, organizational leaders could affect control through individual self-discipline. Fournier's theory might appeal to Army leaders concerned with discipline. Of particular note, Fournier examined how business leaders applied this form of control in cases where employees were unlikely to self-identify as professionals. In such cases, within the workplace, leaders used the rhetoric of professionalization to describe employees as professionals and their labor as the exercise of some expertise. She argued this did not undermine its meaning. Fournier saw that a business' employees could be motivated to behave in certain ways depending on the degree to which they internalized the profession label. In this way, Fournier's theory explained why businesses within traditionally non-professional occupations would expend considerable time and resources describing themselves as professions. Fournier's theory also explained why business leaders did not specify a subset of employees and instead labeled all their employees members of a profession. Assuming Army leaders were aware of Fournier's theory or similar ones, Army leaders may have included DA civilians as one of the profession's co-equal cohorts to ensure DA civilians also internalized the professional label.
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In 2010, James Pierce examined professionalization in terms of organizational culture.
According to Pierce, organizational This section presented the concepts of narrative, self-identity, and organizational culture.
As has been discussed, narrative is a means by which people self-identify as members of groups.
According to Ochs and Capps, the narrative process shapes feelings, beliefs, and actions. Pierce suggested such control was theoretically possible according to proponents of the functionalist perspective of organizational theory. Fournier described how business leaders have adopted the rhetoric of professionalism for the specific purpose of modifying employee behavior.
Furthermore, Fournier argued that applying the label, professional, to non-professional occupations did not appear to undermine observed positive outcomes. This section suggested
Army leaders might have adopted the Army Profession Campaign as a way to operationalize narrative theory to improve or maintain discipline by appealing to individuals' self-identities.
Fournier's observations support Army leaders in their inclusion of DA civilians and all uniformed service members, to include reservists, in the Army Profession construct. 43 Pierce, "Is Culture Congruent with Professional Development?" 20. 44 Ibid.
THE ARMY PROFESSION CAMPAIGN LITERATURE
It is possible at this point to argue that Army leaders intended to use the campaign to Profession concepts with value and belief artifacts as support for the conclusion that Army leaders adopted a Fournier-style approach to the Army Profession Campaign.
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The Army Strategic Planning Guidance, 2013, also supports this conclusion. In the section outlining the Army Campaign Plan's second objective, the Army Profession appears twice. First, the text reads, "leadership development must inculcate the ideals of the Army Profession."
47 Lower, on the same page, the text reads:
Continued focus on the Army Profession, a self-policing organization, skilled in the practice of arms, is essential to inculcating the gains of the last 11 years while simultaneously eliminating the deleterious effects of prolonged combat."
This passage suggests Army leaders want to use the Army Profession Campaign to improve or reinforce discipline throughout the force.
The idea that exposure to persistent combat has had, is having, or will have a negative effect on discipline throughout the force carries across all the Army Profession Campaign literature. Other Army documents suggest Army leaders remain greatly concerned with this issue.
In "The Red Book," Army leaders described the problem:
Stress was increasingly placing Soldiers at risk, Soldiers who were suffering from physical and behavioral health issues and in need of more vigilant leader oversight, risk mitigation and medical healthcare . . . it also discovered a growing high-risk population of Soldiers engaging in criminal and high-risk behavior with increasingly more severe outcomes including violent crime, suicide attempts and suicide, and accidental death.
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Although the above quotation and the remainder of the report clearly suggest Army leaders have been considering all available options to improve discipline, they do not directly support the conclusion that the Army Profession Campaign is itself one such effort. Campaign because they had, in regards to discipline, determined that, after 10 years at war, the Army was struggling to maintain current standards. During the same forum, Dr. Snider addressed why the Army Profession Campaign included an appeal to the individual's self-identity:
What caused you to think and accept an identity and therefore a motivation that you were uniquely a professional? This is an issue of role identity. Identity is where we start. The institutional identity of the Army is a profession and the individual identity that you are a professional. Civilians were never previously included in any definitions, scholarly or otherwise, of a profession of arms. When Army leaders decided to include civilians and all service members, they invented the Army Profession. It is difficult to accept arguments that the Army Profession arose logically through earnest dialogue.
In 1999, Dr. Snider co-authored a monograph with John Nagl and Tony Pfaff. In that monograph, the authors gave only the most cursory nod to acknowledge the idea that noncommissioned officers and Army civilians were professionals. In nearly the same breath, they explained their model of the profession of arms based on sacrifice and obligation:
The trucker, while he may have certain contractual obligations, cannot be morally obligated to put his and others' lives at risk to fulfill them. He will simply have to live with the penalty, and the customer will simply have to live without the goods. For this reason, especially given the kinds of sacrifices that the officer is required to make, it is important that the obligation run much deeper than a mere "contract." The authors of the campaign had not mentioned Army civilians at all in their previous White Papers. Doing so apparently sparked enough debate to necessitate writing another White Paper dedicated entirely to explaining how Army civilians can be seen as a unique profession and how that profession nests with the Army's profession of arms.
57 By the time it became doctrine, the To allow the construct to include everyone in the Army, the authors of the Army Profession had to redefine the Army's expert work or the service it provides the American people.
Including all uniformed service members required a broader interpretation of expert work than The Army creates its own expert knowledge, both theoretical and practical, for the defense of the Nation through land combat power. This land power is normally applied in Joint Operations through the full spectrum of conflict and the subsequent establishment of a better peace. Such knowledge is unique and is not generally held outside the Army Profession. 
